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THE ROLES OF LAWBOOKS
Alfred F. Conard*

The law is a bookish profession. It is not the only one to depend
on books, but it displays a unique veneration for them. A clergyman
or a literary critic might have his portrait painted with a book in his
hand, but only a lawyer would-choose to be portrayed against a
backdrop of a hundred volumes ·in well-matched bindings. When
Langdell sought to dignify the study of law as a science, he declared
that the lawyer's library is his laboratory.
Langdell's dictum brings smiles to our lips today because Dean
Pound diverted our attention from "law in books" to "law in action." We want to know how the law works, and what it works upon
in the areas of human behavior, beliefs, and desires. But since we
lack firsthand means for discovering these facts, we still depend on
books to inform ourselves about the interactions of legal rules with
the human and social matrix in which they operate. The quality of
the law at any time, therefore, is profoundly dependent on the quality of the books relating to law that have appeared in preceding years.
The Michigan Law Review's annual review of books provides us
with an informative sample of the recently published books that are
available to inform the lawyer's mind. No doubt the sample is biased by the idiosyncracies of the editors' tastes and of the reviewers'
receptivity. But these biases are more likely to enhance than to diminish the significance of the selection.
I
In order to bring my observations within practicable limits, I
have focused my attention on only one of these annual volumes the fat collection of 1981, which reviewed sixty-three different
volumes. For similar reasons, I have not read each of the sixty-three
books reviewed, but have judged their contents and approaches
largely from what their reviewers have said about them, with only
occasional glances at the originals. To add seasoning, I have also
looked at the thirteen volumes that have been awarded prizes or
honorable mentions by the Coif selection committee in the triennial
awards from 1964 to 1979.
The most striking aspect of the selection of books reviewed was
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that a majority were neither expositions of rules of law nor critiques
of these rules. Nearly one fifth (twelve out of sixty-three by my
count) were historical accounts of the events and institutions with
which the law deals. Two of these were studies of criminal behavior
in thirteenth- and fourteenth-century England. Five were histories
of legal developments in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, with
a surprising variety of subjects such as the pre-Civil War federal
courts, the post-Civil War Freedmen's Bureau; the judicial role of
the House of Lords, the activities of prosecutors, and the conduct of
institutions of confinement, including both prisons and mental hospitals. Another handful were histories of contemporary phenomena,
from the International Red Cross to the Mafia, spanning the regulation of nuclear power and blacks' struggle for equality. One of the
Coif awards went to a distinguished book in this category - Dawson's Oracles of the Law. Although some of these accounts contain
an imperfectly hidden agenda, they are refreshing in their presentation of events without dictating the conclusions about contemporary
law that the reader ought to draw from them.
A much larger group of nonlaw books analyzed legal processes
from social science viewpoints. Nine were expressly psychological.
Two works subjected eyewitness testimony to the teachings of experimental psychology. Social psychology and mental disease claimed
another half-dozen volumes, with special reference to the forensic
uses and abuses of these sciences in determining fitness for trial, eligibility for criminal penalties, and solution of family conflicts. Three
economic studies examined problems of energy, bureaucracy, and
public finance.
Sociologists have so thoroughly naturalized themselves in the legal forest that one has trouble deciding whether to classify many of
their current works as "legal" or "sociological." The merger is signified by a flock of legal studies that employ techniques borrowed
from the social sciences to produce facts rather than arguments. The
most exotic of these were a pair of studies of the techniques of dispute resolution in remote areas such as East Africa, the Middle East,
and Latin America. Closely related to these was a study of the lingering effects in colonies and former colonies of the legal systems
introduced by colonizing powers. Less exotic studies produced revealing observations on legal services for the poor and case selection
in the Supreme Court.
The ultimate intellectual challenge - determining the values
that a legal system should subserve - was accepted by four works
reviewed in the 1981 anthology. Two were boldly entitled A Theory
of Criminal Justice; a third, provocatively disguised as Mountains
Without Handrails, pondered the value of preserving the most beautiful works of nature; a fourth disdained all restrictions of subject
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matter by speculating on A Theory ofthe Good and the Right. In two
decades of Coif awards, two works of this type were honored Rawls's A Theory of Justice and Dworkin's Taking Rights Seriously.
With less than half of the 1981 anthology left, we approach the
works that deal primarily with specific rules of law. Three of these
were historical, tracing the recent history of tort law and of contract
law in the common-law system, and of political crime in Europe.
They represent an approach that has led to some of the most distinguished legal writing of recent decaqes. Lawrence Friedman and
Willard Hurst won Coif prizes with probes in this vein, and Hurst
has authored at least half a dozen other works that could easily have
won the same accolade.

II
Finally, I come down to that minority of books that seem to deal
primarily with law in force in the United States. Laying aside seven
casebooks on constitutional law, there were about a dozen volumes
in this area. Not surprisingly, some of them clustered around centers
of current controversy. Inequality inspired volumes on Race, Racism,
and American Law, Apartheid in America, and Equality and the
Rights of Women. School problems motivated Legislated Learning
and Education by Choice. Judicial activism seems to have triggered
The Judge and Judicial Review and the National Political Process.
The vagaries of tort law stimulatedA Nation of Guinea Pigs and The
Duty to Act. Only one, Macneil's New Social Contract, approached
a quiet area of scholarly concern.
What struck me most forcefully about the books was a difference
in approaches. On the one hand, an author may attempt primarily
to describe what the law is, including a prognosis of its tendencies
and a disclosure of the author's preferences. On the other, the author may put his primary emphasis on what the law ought to be defending the existing law if it is right, and attacking it if it is wrong.
In this group of a dozen books, only one (Macneil's) seemed to be an
interpretive description of the law, while the others seemed more like
briefs of argument for or against the existing law.
This division was a little surprising, in view of the veneration that
has traditionally been accorded to the "treatise" approach. This approach characterized at least three items on the Coif list - Currie's
Essays on the Conflict of Laws, Gilmore's Security Interests in Personal Property, and Palmer's The Law of Restitution. These books
are rich in personal evaluations, but the personal opinions are generally distinguishable from descriptions of the law, and are balanced
by recognition of opposing viewpoints. In contrast, nearly all of the
books in the group under discussion devoted themselves almost entirely to advocating particular rules.
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I find it reassuring that legal writers are not only concerned with
what the law ought to be, but are prepared to direct their writing
explicitly toward advocating the better law. However, I was disappointed by the predominant quality and content of the advocacy. In
most cases, I did not feel enlightened by the arguments made - even
where I sympathized with the conclusions - but rather turned off by
the hammer blows of persuasion, which reminded me of TV
commercials.
There were at least two aspects of these works that made them
unpersuasive. One was the brief-of-argument mode. In a brief, one
mentions counterviews only to demolish them. One glides as undetectably as possible from the settled law to the position advocated,
trying to make the position advocated seem like a mere application,
or an inevitable corollary, of the settled law. When
I sit as a moot-court judge, I have no objection to this type of persuasion because I can rely on the opposing brief to expose the non sequiturs. When I read an argumentative book, without an opposing
brief at hand, I am forced to do my own rebutting. Before going
further I want to see the contrary arguments; if the author does not
supply them, I stop reading. The brief-of-argument approach is particularly frustrating when, as in Lawrence Tribe's Constitutional
Law, a book that calls itself a "treatise" slips silently from truths
perceived by judges to truths perceived by the author.
This aspect of the books reviewed reminded me of a thesis advanced early in the present century by a British writer named Baty
under the title, Polarized Law. Baty urged that legal literature would
be more interesting if writers would choose an objective to which
their analysis would be subordinate. If one turns to the writing of
Baty's time, with its exaggerated reference to judicial wisdom, one
can sympathize with his viewpoint. (It is an unfortunate coincidence
that Baty's best known polemic was directed against vicarious liability - a principle that has only increased its breadth and depth in the
decades since he attacked it.)
A second source of disappointment was the infrequency with
which the teachings of history, psychology, economics, sociology, or
philosophy were brought to bear on the choice of legal rules. The
wealth of social scientists' observations about law - suggested by
the broad selection of books from these areas reviewed in the 1981
collection - seems to have had but slight influence on most lawyers'
thinking about what laws should be.
Admittedly, it is difficult to find links between social facts and
legal decisions, but it has been done. In the collection under present
consideration, Wolgast•~ Equality and the Rights of Women is a good
example of argument from history, physiology, and culture. Among
the Coif awards, Packer's Limits ofthe Criminal Sanction and Eisen-
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berg's Structure ofthe Corporation are illustrative. But this approach
seems to be rare.
I take comfort in the impression - unsubstantiated by quantitative data - that less polarized and more scientific writing will be
found more frequently in law reviews. Law reviews are often hostile
to disguised briefs of argument; book publishers, on the other hand,
may be partial to books that are contentious enough to win attention.
Perhaps lawyers would be better served by a review of law reviews
than by a review of books.
III

These reflections frame the dilemma facing a legal writer. He
fills no need if he merely summarizes statutes and cases; digests,
loose-leaf services, Lexis, and West/aw have taken over that job. Occasionally the need arises for a synthesis of theory in a new or underdeveloped area. Ken Davis's work on Administrative Law and
George Palmer's on The Law of Restitution have filled needs of this
kind. But in most areas the analytic and taxonomic task has been
performed long since by writers like Story, Williston, Scott, and
Prosser.
Consequently, the polarized writers are quite right in deciding
that they should be advocates. They should not be reproached
merely because they advance positions that readers cannot accept.
As Christopher Morley has said, "[t]he real purpose of books is to
trap the mind into doing its own thinking."
The writer's dilemma is to take a position sufficiently challenging
to excite the reader's mind, but not so dogmatic as to stun and anesthetize it. Perceptions of social facts are the prime mind-openers.
Differences in how we feel about affirmative action, exclusion of evidence, or products liability are likely to depend on how we perceive
the prevalent behavior of white employers and black employees,
how we perceive the predominant activities of police and of the people whom police arrest, and how we perceive the practices of pharmaceutical manufacturers and Food and Drug Administration
officials concerning new drugs. Advocates will do more to excite the
minds of readers if they disclose and discuss the supposed social
facts that underlie their preferences than if they assume a polar objective without revealing how they found it.
Fortunately, social scientists' and philosophers' explorations of
the world of law are producing more and more grist for legal mills.
Although the linkages are not made as often as we would wish, they
are appearing. They tend to appear earlier in law reviews than in
books. But eventually they gain the authority conveyed by a hard
cover, and a card in the library catalogue. As they do, we can be
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assured that they will not go unremarked in the Michigan Law Review's annual review of books.

